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Freud, Psychoanalysis and Anti-Semitism 
  Sigmund Freud was a proudly assertive adherent of the Western 
cultural tradition, specifically that of the German tradition 
associated with Goethe. However, from the first rude shock of the 
anti-Semitism he experienced at University until the moment of 
exile after the Anschluss, Freud was always aware of the profound 
discrepancy between this ‘Germany of the mind’ and the reality of 
the Germanic society in which he actually lived. Yerushalmi (1991, 
p.40) notes, 
 Certainly a vital part of him lived in a Germanic universe of 
thought, but this Germany of the mind and the imagination 
that he, like so many Central European Jews, cherished was 
that of the German Enlightenment... of literature and 
philosophy, of nineteenth-century German science. Unlike so 
many of his contemporaries, Freud rarely confused this with 
the real Germany or Austria, even if part of him may have 
strongly wanted to do so. And this long before Nazism and 
Hitler. 
It may be that Freud’s allegiance to his Jewish identity helped 
him maintain the acerbic and somewhat distant attitude towards the 
reality of German culture that went along with his admiration for 
its highest values; that is, not being fully part of it, he could 
love it without being infatuated by it. Such an approach is 
arguably a psychoanalytic value in itself: one can admire beauty 
without being taken in by it; there must always be some space left 
over for analysis. The Jew outside the beckoning culture might, if 
he or she is to remain sober and realistically cautious, do well 
also to retain this ironic stance. 
 In any case, Freud’s Jewish identity seems without doubt to 
have had a massive influence on the form and content of his 
psychoanalytic discoveries and on the formation of the movement 
itself. The energy devoted towards intellectual searching and 
ethical practice which Freud channelled into the B’nai Brith at 
the turn of the twentieth century (Diller, 1991), were very soon 
afterwards taken over wholesale into the psychoanalytic movement 
itself, a movement which was entirely Jewish for its first few 
years and predominantly Jewish almost everywhere until well after 
the Second World War. These Jewish origins had a very substantial 
effect on the content of psychoanalysis, particularly in respect 
of the rationalist values to which it committed itself, as well as 
on its social relations –the intense, family-like bonds with which 
its adherents have always been characterised, in turn leading to 
schisms and passionate advocacy of belief structures, sometimes 
irrespective of anything that might resemble evidence. The energy 
derived from the impulse to make something new and better –to 
redeploy what were fantasised as traditional Jewish intellectual 
skills previously committed to taxing religious study- was poured 
into various cultural projects of the time, including if not 
especially psychoanalysis. This energy, it might even be argued, 
was used up in a flame that burnt so strongly that it left later 
generations of analysts enervated, unable to match anything that 
had come before –not necessarily a healthy state of affairs, but 
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somewhat characteristic of a variety of modernist movements, 
including contemporary Judaism itself. 
 Freud’s investment of psychoanalysis with his Jewish 
consciousness had several sources, including a rather mystical 
sense of some hidden power drawing Freud towards identification 
with Jews and Judaism (despite his consistent and principled 
atheism), an explicit recognition of the value of being an 
‘outsider’ to the host Western culture, and an assertive and angry 
response to anti-Semitism. Freud made a nod towards analysing the 
first of these, for instance in Civilisation and its Discontents 
(1930) with its famous opening repudiating the ‘oceanic feeling’ 
at the root of many religious experiences; and the second was more 
or less conscious anyway: it does not take much analysis to see 
how being a marginal can help you see clearly, and perhaps inure 
you to criticism. But the third source, anti-Semitism, to which 
Freud stood up all through his life, was also subjected to a 
provocative analysis to which he returned in his last major work, 
as an old man trying to make sense of the intense investment in 
hatred of Jews and, by extension if not explicitly, of the ‘other’ 
in general. This article examines the nature and implications of 
this analysis. 
Psychoanalysis as a response to anti-Semitism 
At the simplest sociological level, anti-Semitism constructed 
psychoanalysis through enforcing a collective consciousness 
amongst the set of Jewish intellectuals and doctors surrounding 
Freud, pushing them together as a ‘movement’ rather than allowing 
them to dissipate their affiliations amongst a number of welcoming 
groups. There were, it seems, few such welcomes available: if Jews 
were to work on something new, they would have to do so together. 
‘The irony of the impact of incipient racial anti-Semitism on 
Freud, and on German Jews like him,’ writes Klein (1985, p.55), 
‘was the influence it had on their discovery of a new basis of 
emotional and ideological support,’ this being other Jews. The 
sense of comfort given by Jewish companionship in the face of a 
hostile world was undoubtedly translated into the psychoanalytic 
movement, which has always had more than its fair share of 
paranoid fantasies as well as always being the object of 
fascination and abuse –very much like the Jews. As Klein notes, 
the other side of this is a very positive sense of self-worth, 
coded amongst Jews as a deep-seated idea of ‘chosenness’, however 
this might be interpreted under modern conditions (for example, as 
there being something special about Jewish ethical responsibility, 
or as an idea about Jewish ‘genius’ or the ‘Jewish mind’). 
Psychoanalysis too, in direct proportion to the criticism heaped 
upon it, has always taken pride in its special knowledge, its 
access to truth: the unconscious exists, it was discovered by 
Freud, and it can only become available to scientific scrutiny 
through the methods of psychoanalysis. Everyone who does not 
understand this is either ignorant or insufficiently analysed; the 
psychoanalytic ark is the one chosen to carry Freud’s tablets of 
stone. 
 As well as this relatively straightforward connection between 
the anti-Semitism of the surrounding society and the clustering 
together of Jews, either (at the time) as intellectuals or as 
Zionists or as psychoanalysts, there is a more specific response 
to anti-Semitic perceptions to be found in the content of the 
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psychoanalytic world view. This has to do with its focus on sex. 
Gilman (1993) has documented this most exhaustively, arguing that, 
throughout the nineteenth century, there was a fascination both in 
popular and in medical culture with the body and ‘difference’ of 
the Jew, and that this particular manifestation of ‘othering’ 
focused on sexuality. The Jew was seen as having a kind of rabid 
yet damaged sexuality, manifested in the male Jew’s circumcised 
state (and, though Gilman discusses this less, the female Jewess’ 
oriental-like sultry sexuality) and through modes of insanity 
which were basically hysterical in form and were caused by incest 
and early seduction. The Jew thus becomes the embodiment of 
feminised masculinity, which turns into madness. ‘For at the close 
of the nineteenth century,’ writes Gilman (1991, p.333), ‘the idea 
of seeing the hysteric was closely bound to the idea of seeing the 
Jew -but very specifically the male Jew... The Jew is the 
hysteric; the Jew is the feminised Other; the Jew is seen as 
different, as diseased.’ In the popular and medical fantasy, 
circumcision was equivalent to castration, provoking fear and 
abhorrence, and not a little fascination. Gilman suggests that if 
this was the mirror held up to the Jew by the outside world, then 
Jews on the way to emancipation, anxiously scanning the faces 
around them for traces of acceptance and rejection, would 
internalise the racist equivalence: Jew equals emasculated man. 
One response, one might guess, would be repudiation of Jewish 
identity, and this was certainly the route taken by many Jews, 
including some who converted to Christianity. Another response, 
the one adopted by Freud, was to take this supposedly peculiar 
Jewish condition and argue that it was not specific to the Jews, 
but universal. 
 According to Freud, feminisation through castration is the 
key anxiety shared by all men, and the core distress of the female 
state: the ‘bedrock’ condition of human psychology is repudiation 
of femininity (Freud, 1937, p.252). However, what marks the human 
subject as specifically human is precisely the imposition of 
castration: the Oedipus complex, which forces on the young child 
the reality of limitations on desire (the boy must not sexually 
possess his mother; the girl must not have the father’s baby) has 
its effect because of castration anxiety. It is not, therefore, 
only the Jew who is marked as castrated, even though it is the 
Jew’s body that displays that mark; rather, all humans, men and 
women alike (but particularly men in this context) are 
psychologically organised through castration. Gilman (1991, p.336) 
makes the link with anti-Semitism explicit in his reading of this, 
claiming that, ‘for Freud every move concerning the articulation 
of the nature of human sexuality responds to his desire to resist 
the charges of his own Jewish specificity by either projecting the 
sense of his own sexual difference on to other groups such as 
women or by universalizing the attack on Jewish particularism, 
mirrored in the particularism of the Jew’s body.’ That is, one of 
the central claims of Freudian psychoanalysis –that human 
subjectivity is constructed amidst and through castration- can be 
understood as a universalisation of an anti-Semitic claim. The Jew 
consequently can no longer be pilloried as deviant; he or she is 
rather the flag-bearer for the whole of humankind. Only, as Lacan 
(1972-3) would later say about women, humankind in general does 
not know this, but is caught up in its fears and neurotic 
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obsessions; only Jews and psychoanalysts know what is what. 
Perhaps this captures the kernel of truth in Derrida’s (1995, 
p.46) seemingly bizarre statement that, ‘At issue here is nothing 
less than taking seriously the question whether a science can 
depend on something like a circumcision.’ 
Protecting psychoanalysis: anti-Semitism amongst the analysts 
The deep roots of psychoanalysis in Jewish identity and 
culture had a powerful impact on the development and content of 
psychoanalysis itself. The effects of this have been very 
profound, both positively, in giving psychoanalysis an identity 
and cultural legacy of its own, and negatively, in fostering a 
sense of siege and an over-reliance on loyalty over the pursuit of 
critical engagement with differing points of view. However, the 
prime ‘negative’ effect of psychoanalysis’ Jewish origins lies in 
the way in which anti-Semitism comes to bear on it, both 
internally and externally. Freud himself was very aware of what he 
regarded as the danger that psychoanalysis would be seen merely as 
a  ‘Jewish national affair’, stirring up anti-Semitic resistance 
as well as the unavoidable resistance due to psychoanalysis’ own 
unpalatable truths. It was for this reason that he was especially 
enthusiastic about the presence of Jung in the movement, and 
optimistic that through Jung the future of psychoanalysis would be 
preserved in the outside world. Here, he was out of step with some 
of his Jewish colleagues from the start: Abraham, for instance, 
who had studied and suffered with the Swiss as a young doctor, was 
never much enamoured with Jung, nor taken in by him. In this, 
Abraham was more prescient than Freud, who was so wishful in his 
relation to Jung that he could either not see, or decided to 
overlook, the latter’s transparent grandiosity and anti-Semitism. 
Drawing on one of his favourite Biblical allusions, Freud saw Jung 
as Joshua to his Moses, the one who would take the movement into 
the Promised Land when it was his, Freud’s, fate only to glimpse 
this place from afar (Diller, 1991, p.179). Irritated by Abraham’s 
and others’ opposition to Jung’s appointment in 1910 as President 
of the International Psychoanalytic Association, Freud phrased his 
views in melodramatically apocalyptic terms:  
Most of you are Jews and therefore incompetent to win friends 
for the new teaching. Jews must be content with the modest 
role of preparing the ground... I am getting on in years and 
am weary of being perpetually attacked. We are in danger. 
They won’t leave me a coat on my back. This Swiss will save 
us -will save me and will save you as well. (Ibid, p.172) 
‘They won’t leave me a coat on my back’: this is the classic 
complaint of the old Jew threatened either by anti-Semites or by 
the grasping and internecine quarrelling of his ungrateful 
children. Even when Freud was forced to recognise Abraham’s acuity 
in identifying Jung’s anti-Semitism, he thought he should overlook 
it: ‘But my opinion is that we must as Jews if we want to 
cooperate with other people, develop a little masochism and be 
prepared to endure a little injustice’ (Abraham and Freud, 1965, 
p.46). Freud was staunch in standing up to anti-Semitism where he 
encountered it, but the idea that the outside world would always 
be full of anti-Semites and if one wants to get on with life one 
has to put up with this was a consistent strain in his thinking. 
In the case of Jung, however, he was desperate not on his own 
account, but out of anxiety over the survival of psychoanalysis 
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itself: if a non-Jewish home for psychoanalysis could not be 
found, in order to demonstrate its universalism but also simply to 
protect it from abuse, then the chances of its survival were slim. 
‘Our Aryan comrades are quite indispensable to us,’ Freud wrote to 
Abraham, ‘otherwise psychoanalysis would fall a victim to anti-
Semitism’ (Diller, 1991, p.183). Jung himself clearly also saw 
things in racial terms, complaining to Ernest Jones, for example, 
when Jones failed to support him against Freud, that ‘I thought 
you were a Christian’ (Ibid., p185). The effects of this 
racialised dispute on later relationships between Jungians and 
Freudians, and indeed on the history of the psychodynamic 
movements (including in Germany under the Nazis), was profound, 
leaving a bitter taste nearly a hundred years after their split.  
The other central non-Jew in the establishment of the 
psychoanalytic movement was Ernest Jones. Unlike Jung, Jones 
retained a very strong loyalty to Freud throughout his life, yet 
also showed an independence of mind and spirit and an 
organisational capacity that was of immense value to the movement 
as a whole, however ambiguous and ambivalent some of his 
activities might have been. Whist these ambiguities were to a 
considerable extent produced by the complex exigencies of the age, 
particularly in relation to the policy of appeasement of the 
Nazis, Jones’ mixed attitude towards the Jewish domination of 
psychoanalysis also played its part. On the one hand, there was 
something about the intellectual alertness and quickness of mind 
of the European Jewish intelligentsia that attracted Jones and 
helped him feel less ‘English’ and more Welsh –and hence more 
critical and less stuffy. He identified himself as having the 
position of ‘Shabbes-goy among the Viennese’ (Yerushalmi, 1991, 
p.53), this being quite a good joke as it conveys the idea that 
the Jewish analysts needed a non-Jew to carry out tasks which, 
because of their identity (albeit not their religious beliefs) 
they found hard to do. Jones certainly seems to have been better 
at organisation than his squabbling comrades, and the usefulness 
to the movement of this sympathetic non-Jew in a position of 
institutional power was immense during the dark Nazi night. For 
Jones, it seems as though his links with Freud and the Jewish 
Viennese in particular gave him a sense of his own exoticism, as 
well as a setting in which his qualities of imaginative service 
could shine and be appreciated. 
The negative side of Jones’ ambivalence was also strong, 
however, and was matched in some measure by the ambivalence 
surrounding him. Klein (1985, p.143) comments that, 
Jones was especially unhappy about the manifestation of 
Jewish pride within the circle. He felt that despite the warm 
welcome Freud extended to Jung and to himself in 1907-8, and 
despite his genuine interest in attracting non-Jewish 
followers, Freud maintained a ‘certain mistrust’ for non-
Jews. 
There is independent evidence that Freud did indeed express a 
feeling of ‘racial strangeness’ towards Jones at this time (ibid., 
p.142), so Jones was not being particularly paranoid in thinking 
that there was some holding back in the warmth of the welcome. 
Later on, in the wake of the disappointment over Jung, this 
feeling became even more pronounced. Diller (1991, p. 198) notes 
that, 
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Unfortunately, this episode had only reinforced Freud’s basic 
mistrust of non-Jews, which in turn made him more susceptible 
to those amongst the Viennese who continued to be suspicious 
of Jones, both personally and racially. ... Jones did feel 
that the Jews on the committee, Freud least of all, showed a 
rather heightened sensitivity to anti-Semitism and mistrust 
of non-Jews. 
Whilst this suggests that Jones’ sense of the Jews sticking 
together and regarding him with some unease might have been well-
founded, it is also apparent that he failed to appreciate the 
extent to which Jewish identity and pride was important not only 
in motivating Freud himself, but also in energising the entire 
fledgling movement in the early years of its existence. For Jones, 
it seems that this Jewish foundation, which he saw as a vestige of 
a racial sense of Jewish superiority, was not only a nuisance in 
relation to his own position but also interfered with the 
establishment of psychoanalysis as a science. At times, his 
failure to distinguish between the Jewish analysts’ nervous 
response to anti-Semitism and a sense of personal injury or 
antagonism, either led him to, or drew out in him, anti-Semitic 
attitudes at odds with most of his actions and beliefs. Yerushalmi 
(1991, p.53) gives the clearest example. 
 [T]oward the end of World War II, the amiable disciple 
delivered himself of a disquisition entitled ‘The Psychology 
of the Jewish Question’ which advises total assimilation as 
the solution to anti-Semitism and contains some astonishing 
passages, including the broad implication that most German-
Jewish refugees in England were ungrateful draft-dodgers. 
Turning to the physical features of the Jews that contribute 
to unconscious hostility against them, Jones identifies one 
as circumcision which, according to Freud himself, arouses 
castration anxieties. The other is Jones’ original 
contribution: ‘The second physical feature alluded to is the 
Hittite nose, so suggestive of deformity, which the Jews 
unfortunately picked up in their wanderings and which by an 
unlucky chance, is associated with a dominant gene.’ 
Some stray comments, and more stray actions, of Jones in the 
1930s suggest that the attitude expressed in this ‘disquisition’ 
were not isolated aberrations, nor did they lack effects, although 
this is not to claim that Jones was anti-Semitic in the way that 
Jung was. Rather, the origins of psychoanalysis lie in a complex 
network of identity and social processes, within which Jewish 
identity was a key player, and which thus necessarily evoked the 
immensely powerful forces of anti-Semitism. This had some profound 
effects in mobilising the activities of the Jewish analysts, first 
and foremost Freud himself, but it also drew along in its wake 
tempestuous ambivalence towards psychoanalysis by non-Jews, even 
those who became central to the psychoanalytic movement. Not all 
non-Jews fell into this trap, of course, but the exceptions 
certainly surprised Freud, as he noted when getting generous 
greetings from Thomas Mann on his eightieth birthday: ‘A noble 
Goy! It’s nice to know that these, too, exist. One is apt to doubt 
it sometimes’ (Diller, 1991, p.128). Given the circumstances at 
the time (this was 1936), Freud’s comment is not as ungracious as 
it sounds; more to the point, he was well aware that there were 
‘noble’ non-Jews (he admired many of them and benefited directly 
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from some), but by the end of his life he had ceased to doubt the 
pervasiveness and deep-rootedness of anti-Semitism as a 
psychological and socio-political phenomenon. The question that 
arises from this, for a mind as alert and unforgiving as Freud’s, 
is how to explain it: what is it that makes anti-Semitism so 
virulent, what irrationality fixes it so firmly in place, and why, 
amongst all the possible victims of racist hatred, do the Jews 
figure so large? 
Theorising anti-Semitism 
 In the 1930s, faced with inescapable evidence of the 
virulence and pervasiveness of the anti-Semitic ‘repressed’ 
returning, Freud produced his most sustained and provocative 
reading of the phenomenon, in the context of his epic meditation 
on Jewish identity, Moses and Monotheism. This book is set up as a 
scholarly exploration of the pre-history of monotheistic Judaism, 
advancing the radical claim that Moses was an Egyptian who sought 
out the Hebrew slaves in order to create a monotheistic cult, and 
whose personality can be glimpsed behind the version of God 
created in this cult. Exploration of the meaning and madness of 
these claims has taken up much of the critical commentary on the 
book from the time it was published. However, one powerful way of 
reading Moses and Monotheism, which leaves behind questions of 
accuracy concerning the assertions Freud makes about the origins 
of Judaism, is as Freud’s search for some resolution of the 
lifelong tensions in relation to his Jewish identity, occurring in 
the context of the rise of Nazism. Thus, Diller (1991, p.137) 
argues that Freud’s ‘great hesitancy and agitation over the work, 
his return to biblical themes of his childhood, his resurrection 
of the Oedipal drama and instinct theory, and the fact that 
although he was gravely ill, near death, and deeply disturbed by 
the outside world, he could still harness the energy to write such 
a book -all point to Moses and Monotheism as a last and final 
reckoning for him, a parting opportunity to find emotional peace 
and quietude, especially in relation to his Jewish identity.’ 
Jacqueline Rose (2003, p.77), in partial contrast with this, 
argues that Moses and Monotheism reveals Freud’s continued state 
of being torn ‘between belonging and not belonging as a Jew’; she 
thus emphasises not so much the resolution of Freud’s Jewish 
identity as its continuing openness. Both these positions, and 
many others, imply that the main thrust of the book is a quest to 
deal with personally insistent identity issues. 
 Readings of Moses and Monotheism as an expression of Freud’s 
personal identity crisis, or at least quandary over his Jewish 
identity, in the 1930s are legitimised in part by his own 
successive ‘prefaces’ to the book, as he worried away about the 
propriety of publishing it. At the beginning, famously, Freud sets 
this context of anxiety as relating to the Jewish people and his 
possible betrayal of them at a time of trouble; significantly, he 
does not hesitate to remind the reader of his own membership of 
this disparaged group:  
 To deprive a people of a man whom they take pride in as the 
greatest of their sons is not a thing to be gladly or 
carelessly undertaken, least of all by someone who is himself 
one of them. (Freud, 1939, p.7) 
Freud’s defence of his actions, as ever, is in the name of 
scientific truth, reflecting his deep-rooted if increasingly 
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pessimistic belief that the only viable route to human progress is 
through the dispelling of illusions and the exercise of 
rationality. 
 But we cannot allow any such reflection to induce us to put 
the truth aside in favour of what are supposed to be national 
interests; and, moreover, the clarification of a set of facts 
may be expected to bring us a gain in knowledge. (Ibid.) 
Nothing in Freud’s universe is more important than a ‘gain in 
knowledge’, even the maintenance of Jewish self-esteem –an 
attitude on his part that is linked at least to some Talmudic 
traditions, in which everything bows to the power of truth. 
However, Freud’s main cautions about publication were not caused 
by worry over its effect on the Jews, but for fear that it would 
call down the wrath of external authorities on psychoanalysis 
itself. This is clearest in his ‘Prefatory Note’ to the third part 
of the book, written in Vienna before the Anschluss of March 1938. 
Here, Freud expresses anxiety about alienating the Catholic 
authorities when they might be the only protection against the 
‘prehistoric barbarism’ of Nazism –a hope demonstrating that 
Freud’s reading of political events was not as perspicacious as 
his reading of psychology. Even whilst holding onto this hope, 
however, Freud is characteristically ironic and negative in his 
framing: the old power is to be invested in only because it is 
less destructive than the new. ‘The new enemy,’ he notes 
acerbically, ‘to whom we want to avoid being of service, is more 
dangerous than the old one with which we have already learnt to 
come to terms’ (p.55). Psychoanalysis, Freud rather proudly 
claims, will always draw ‘the resentment of our ruling powers down 
upon us’ because it ‘reduces religion to a neurosis of humanity’, 
so there is not really much chance of finding protection in the 
Church. However, where there is little hope to be had, that which 
there is must be preserved, so Freud, uncertain of the impact of 
his book, chose to withhold it from publication, and clung on to 
the idea that in so doing he might be helping psychoanalysis 
retain its home. ‘Psychoanalysis,’ he wrote, in terms resonant of 
his state of mind, ‘which in the course of my long life has gone 
everywhere, still possesses no home that could be more valuable 
for it than the city in which it was born and grew up’ (p.55). 
 A few months later, however, the Viennese situation and that 
of Freud had changed: the former was in Nazi hands, the latter in 
England. Freud wrote, as part of a further ‘Prefatory Note’, ‘In 
the certainty that I should now be persecuted not only for my line 
of thought but also for my “race” -accompanied by many of my 
friends, I left the city which, from my early childhood, had been 
my home for seventy-eight years’ (p.57). External causes for 
delaying publication have now gone: England has proved friendly, 
if rather prone to be a source of Christian attempts to save 
Freud’s poor soul, and there is nothing any more to be hoped for 
by way of protection for psychoanalysis from the ‘broken reed’ of 
Catholicism. The uncertainties now are only internal, Freud’s 
‘lack of the consciousness of unity and belonging together which 
should exist between an author and his work’, his ‘critical sense’ 
that ‘this book, which takes its start from the man Moses, appears 
like a dancer balancing on the tip of one toe’ (p.58). But time 
and energy have run out, and the deep investment Freud has in this 
final great work is such that he cannot hold it back from its 
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readership. Indeed, thinking psychoanalytically as one must about 
Freud’s work, the very existence of all the uncertainties and 
anxieties, the breaches with logic and narrative sense, the ‘lack 
of balance’ and anxiety that this generates, all suggest that 
there are powerful emotional identifications and wishes at work. 
It is not hard to see what these might be: the identification is 
clearly with Moses, the one who –like Freud- brought a benighted 
people out into the light of order and law; the wish is that 
psychoanalysis, like Judaism, might survive its dispersion. 
 Thus, at the very end of his life, Freud let loose on the 
world his meditation on the origins of Judaism, and on the 
perseverance of Jewish identity. Edward Said (2003) comments on 
how Moses and Monotheism cannot be seen as the summation of 
Freud’s thinking, but rather is another creative departure on his 
part, a lurch further into the unknown, in which the problematics 
of identity and belonging, and correspondingly of otherness and 
marginality, are revolved and left hanging. Said codes this, by 
virtue of a comparison with Beethoven, as a particular kind of 
‘late style’ in which ‘the intellectual trajectory conveyed by the 
late work is intransigence and a sort of irascible 
transgressiveness,’ and ‘Freud wishes us to understand that there 
are other issues at stake here -other, more pressing problems to 
expose than ones whose solution might be comforting, or provide a 
sort of resting-place’ (pp.29-30). For Said, the ‘other issues at 
stake’ are those of a theory of identity, especially the 
opposition to be found in Freud’s writing to a notion that 
identity might be formed once and for all, coherent and complete, 
at either the individual or cultural level. Making Moses an 
Egyptian has the effect of asserting a brokenness within Jewish 
communal identity: at its source is an outsider, so claims for 
national or racial purity must always break down, in the specific 
case of Jews (and Israel), and in the general case of all 
cultures.  
Yerushalmi (1991, p.2) offers a more comprehensive account of 
what Moses and Monotheism might be about.  
 If the book can be read as the final chapter in Freud’s 
lifelong case history it is also a public statement about 
matters of considerably wider consequence -the nature of 
Jewish history, religion and peoplehood, Christianity and 
anti-Semitism- written at a tragic historical juncture. 
In particular, Yerushalmi argues that ‘the true axis of the book’ 
is ‘the problem of tradition’ (p.29), the question of what 
perpetuates the past, what, specifically, gives Judaism its 
continued hold over Jews, even those who, like Freud, have not a 
trace of religious belief in them. Yerushalmi points to the 
pervasive Lamarckian assumptions in the book –the idea that 
specific ‘learned’ characteristics can be passed down through the 
generations, so that all Jews share not just a sense of a past 
history, but have embodied and internalised the actual memory 
trace of that history, linking them with one another through a 
mysterious yet material bond and producing ‘the powerful feeling 
that, for better or worse, one cannot really cease being Jewish’ 
(p.31). Freud’s appeal to ‘dark emotional powers’ (Freud, 1961, 
p.367) inexplicably tying him into his Jewish identity, fits well 
with this idea: it is as if what was learnt and experienced by the 
Jews throughout history becomes the emotional as well as the 
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intellectual heritage of each new generation. In particular here, 
as Freud asserted throughout Moses and Monotheism, the reliance of 
the Jews on intellectual understanding, their appropriation of 
ideas and words as the domain of their portable material heritage, 
and the accompanying emphasis on reason rather than emotion or 
mysticism –these characteristics are both the heritage of all Jews 
and a sign of cultural or even racial superiority. The ‘chosen 
people’ takes a new form in Freud’s account of Judaism’s origins, 
even though he makes the original instigator of the religion an 
Egyptian; and once again it is by no means surprising that these 
same attributes are those valued within the psychoanalytic 
movement itself. 
Moses and Monotheism is a record of Freud’s emotional 
response to Nazism and his attempt to work out his relationship 
with his own Jewish identity in that context. It is also an 
exploration of the conditions that have allowed for the survival 
and reproduction of Judaism in a hostile environment, and hence it 
does indeed deal, as Yerushalmi claims, with questions of 
tradition and inheritance, as well as opening out domains of 
speculation on national and political identity, the aspect of the 
book that Said draws out. It is thus a moving and complex document 
at numerous personal and intellectual levels. In the midst of all 
this, however Freud gives a startling account of anti-Semitism 
that embodies some of the recurrent themes of psychoanalysis’ 
encounter with otherness. Freud’s theory of anti-Semitism, 
whatever its shortcomings, also offers a way into another area of 
considerable importance: how psychoanalytic insights might be 
turned on the phenomenon of racialised hatred. 
A good deal of Moses and Monotheism is devoted to considering 
ways in which Judaism offers an intellectually satisfying and 
rather superior way of engaging with the world, psychologically at 
least. Much of this is given as a kind of sublimation: that in 
preferring an invisible, abstract God to a set of idols or images, 
monotheistic Judaism promotes intellectuality over sensuality, 
with vast gains for the Jews specifically and human culture in 
general. Freud’s final comment on this at the end of the book is 
also his most egregious, showing a fine sensibility for polemic in 
the context of a historical juncture in which Jews and Judaism 
were being castigated and deplored. 
 The pre-eminence given to intellectual labours throughout 
some two thousand years in the life of the Jewish people has, 
of course, had its effect. It has helped to check the 
brutality and the tendency to violence which are apt to 
appear where the development of muscular strength is the 
popular ideal. Harmony in the cultivation of intellectual and 
physical activity, such as was achieved by the Greek people, 
was denied to the Jews. In this dichotomy their decision was 
at least in favour of the worthier alternative. (p.115) 
This beautiful amalgamation of Freud’s admiration for the Greeks 
and his acceptance of at least some aspects of the claim of Jewish 
superiority must be read, again, in the context of the apparent 
historical triumph of ‘brutality and the tendency to violence’ in 
his own lifetime. For Freud, ‘the idea of a single god, as well as 
the rejection of magically effective ceremonial and the stress 
upon ethical demands made in his name’ (p.66) was the originating 
force behind this skew towards intellectuality, and a great 
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achievement it was too. The Jews themselves have always known 
this, hence their pride in their culture and their refusal to 
apologise for holding tightly to what is supposed (by Christians 
as well as atheists) to be an outmoded way of being. Freud, who 
always sought intellectual superiority and achievement, could see 
this in his Jewish compatriots, and could not restrain his own 
approbation of them. 
 The Mosaic prohibition [on representation] elevated God to a 
higher degree of intellectuality... All such advances in 
intellectuality have as their consequence that the 
individual’s self-esteem is increased, that he is made proud 
-so that he feels superior to other people who have remained 
under the spell of sensuality. (pp.14-15) 
Not only is Judaism superior as a religion because it values 
intellectual life over sensuality, but the Jews feel themselves to 
be superior because of their advances in intellectuality. They 
look down on the brutishness of ordinary life and regard 
themselves as special, not so much because of their supposed 
peculiar relationship with God, but more because of their power of 
thought, their capacity to reason and to appreciate the 
significance of ideas and ethical values. Again, if one wanted to 
draw a simple parallel between Freud’s ideas on the virtues of 
Judaism and his advocacy of psychoanalytic values, it would be 
very easy to do so. 
 It is from here that the analysis of anti-Semitism begins. 
Anti-Semitism has numerous sources: ‘A phenomenon of such 
intensity and permanence as the people’s hatred of the Jews must 
of course have more than one ground. It is possible to find a 
whole number of grounds, some of them clearly derived from 
reality, which call for no interpretation, and others, lying 
deeper and derived from hidden sources, which might be regarded as 
the specific reasons’ (p.90). One of these sources is the claim to 
superiority of the Jews, the fact that ‘they have a particularly 
high opinion of themselves, that they regard themselves as more 
distinguished, of higher standing, as superior to other peoples -
from whom they are also distinguished by many of their customs’ 
(p.105). This kind of superiority sense, built out of the deeply-
rooted belief that the Jews really are the ‘chosen people’ of God, 
is bound to produce envy in others: ‘If one is the declared 
favourite of the dreaded father, one need not be surprised at the 
jealousy of one’s brothers and sisters, and the Jewish legend of 
Joseph and his brothers shows very well where this jealousy can 
lead’ (p.106). For the Christians at least, this abhorrent claim 
might even have seemed confirmed by their own religious history; 
why else, if not because they were already chosen as special, 
would the Christian Messiah, Jesus, come from that obscure people? 
This fact intensified hatred of the Jews; somehow, it is always 
they who are selected for the starring role. ‘I venture to 
assert,’ writes Freud pointedly and perhaps with childish relish, 
‘that jealousy of the people which declared itself the first born, 
favourite child of God the Father, has not yet been surmounted 
among other peoples even today: it is as though they had thought 
there was truth in the claim’ (p.91).  
 Other sources of anti-Semitism have less to do with the 
behaviour of the Jews and more to do with their circumstances. 
Freud notes that the fact that Jews live as minorities amongst 
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others and that they are different ‘often in an indefinable way’ 
from the people amongst whom they find themselves, is enough to 
generate continued hostility, especially as despite centuries of 
persecution they show no signs of being ‘exterminated’; ‘on the 
contrary, they show a capacity for holding their own in commercial 
life and, where they are admitted, for making valuable 
contributions for every form of cultural activity’ (p.91). More 
psychologically, building on Freud’s speculative account of the 
origins of culture both in Moses and Monotheism and the earlier 
Totem and Taboo (1914), the Jews are held to be responsible for 
the murder of the primal father and not to have been willing to 
acknowledge this. The argument here is complex, and –as Freud 
himself acknowledged when he referred to his anthropological 
account in Totem and Taboo as a ‘just-so story’ (Freud, 1921, 
p.122)- far-fetched. Paralleling the prehistory of all peoples, 
the Jews are held by Freud to have murdered their own paternal 
founder, Moses. However, the historical truth of this was 
repressed, resurfacing as remorse and an increasing sense of 
guilt, which in turn ‘provided the stimulus for the wishful 
fantasy of the Messiah, who was to return and lead his people to 
redemption and the promised world-dominion’ (p.89). Jesus thus 
represents the return of the murdered primeval father, the return 
of Moses-the-founder; he also re-enacts the murder itself, both in 
an act of expiation (Jesus on the cross) and as retribution: the 
son-religion (Christianity) conquers and destroys the father-
religion (Judaism). ‘Ostensibly aimed at propitiating the father 
god,’ writes Freud (pp.87-8), ‘it ended in his being dethroned and 
got rid of.’ Judaism, both in its refusal to acknowledge and deal 
with the father-murder and in its specificity, its insistence on 
the mark of difference, becomes the recalcitrance of a past wished 
away. Christianity, by contrast, celebrates and ritually atones 
for the murder of the father and extends its wings to all people 
who choose to participate in it –and, historically, to many whose 
choice is forced. The Jews, however, are a thorn in Christianity’s 
side, denying not only its truth but also reminding the world that 
there was once a father and that his shadow looms large, albeit 
mainly in the unconscious. This unadmitted ‘guilt’ of the Jewish 
people, stubbornly holding onto the idea that they are preferred 
amongst all people, acts as a continual provocation, and in so 
doing appeases the guilt of other peoples, specifically the 
Christians, who themselves have primal murder on their hands.  
 Freud was not much impressed with Christianity, seeing it as 
a regression barely able to hold onto the monotheistic 
achievements of Judaism. Christians were even less convincing, and 
Freud turned his ironic vision scathingly on the behaviour and 
attributes of those who claimed allegiance to the Christian 
religion, only to show –in Nazism particularly- that barbarous 
violence was closer to their souls. This is another source of 
profound anti-Semitism, according to Freud; that is, Christians 
are themselves ambivalent, and project their hatred of their own 
religion onto the Jews.  
 [W]e must not forget that all those people who excel today in 
their hatred of Jews became Christians only in late historic 
times, often driven to it by bloody coercion. It might be 
said that they are all ‘misbaptised’. They have been left, 
under a thin veneer of Christianity, what their ancestors 
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were, who worshipped a barbarous polytheism. They have not 
got over a grudge against the new religion which was imposed 
upon them; but they have displaced the grudge on to the 
source from which Christianity reached them. Their hatred of 
Jews is at bottom a hatred of Christians, and we need not be 
surprised that in the German National Socialist revolution 
this intimate relation between the two monotheist religions 
finds such a clear expression in the hostile treatment of 
both of them. (pp.91-2) 
There is an interesting uncertainty here about whether hatred of 
Judaism is fuelled by its refusal to participate in the 
conscience-cleansing rituals of Christianity, or whether it masks 
a deeper hatred of Christianity itself held by those who are at 
heart pagan; but the astute Freudian point is that, whatever their 
unconscious origins, poisonous feelings are directed at the Jews. 
The Jews channel, collect and carry hostile projections; anti-
Semitism allows all who hate to combine together in their 
antagonism towards one specific enemy.  
 Finally, the anxiety-producing mark of bodily difference so 
important in nineteenth century racial thinking, is a key element 
in the generation of anti-Semitic feelings. 
 Further, among the customs by which the Jews made themselves 
separate, that of circumcision has made a disagreeable, 
uncanny impression, which is to be explained, no doubt, by 
its recalling the dreaded castration and along with it a 
portion of the primaeval past which is gladly forgotten. 
(p.91) 
This castration is at the hands of the primal father, who was then 
murdered by the band of brothers whose subsequent guilt and 
atonement became the founding act of civilisation. Circumcision 
therefore not only links with the fear of femininity, but also 
raises the spectre of murder and guilt, reminding the non-Jew of 
the violence at the root of civilisation. The Jew becomes the 
recipient of hatred because he literally embodies the mark of 
castration, visibly presenting to the other nations the great 
vulnerability of the human condition and how it is subject to the 
exercise of power and the enforcement of the law of culture. 
Perhaps it is understandable that this produces a furious 
response: while Jews themselves claim that circumcision ‘perfects’ 
them, to outsiders it looks like an act of subjugation, hence 
demanding renunciation of any omnipotent fantasy. 
 What is one to make of all this? Freud’s text is full of 
telling ambiguities: he debunks religion and, in making the 
founder of Jewish nationhood, its great redeemer, an Egyptian, he 
exposes the fragility of Jewish claims to purity and originality. 
The appropriation of the position of being the ‘chosen people’ of 
God is obviously a wish fulfilment, almost certainly born out of 
the actual powerlessness of the Jews, alongside their stunning 
assertion of intellectual superiority over others. All this 
punctures the case for a secure and strong Jewish identity. On the 
other hand, and much more forcefully, Freud allows domains of 
actual superiority. Whatever the source of monotheistic Judaism, 
its creation and perpetuation is a great achievement of the Jews, 
promoting real intellectual advances and steering them away from 
the brutal sensuality so evident in Nazism and more generally 
amongst many other nations. The so-called civilisation of the 
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others, particularly Christianity, which claims to have surpassed 
Judaism, is mostly a thinly-laid veneer over deep-rooted 
barbarism, and the hatred of the Jews that results is as much a 
hatred of all culture and order as it is a specific anti-Semitism. 
On the other hand again, if a people claims a special place in the 
eyes of its ‘father’ God, and indeed seems to have one, it is not 
surprising that it draws hatred upon itself. Jealousy of this kind 
will always be produced amongst siblings, whether they be 
individuals or entire nations. Then there is the mere provocative 
act of survival itself: how dare the Jews outlive their 
oppressors? And finally there is circumcision, a mark of 
fascination and fear; anti-Semitism sees in it the display of the 
power of castration, the mark of violence, the allure of 
sexuality, and the enthralling inescapability of coercive power. 
All this generates hate: hate of the Jew’s religious priority, of 
the Jew’s special position, of the Jew’s claim to intellectual and 
ethical superiority, of the Jew’s sexuality, of the Jew’s 
difference, his or her ‘otherness’. 
 Freud’s account of anti-Semitism thus revolves a number of 
themes that recur in considerations of racialised hatred, despite 
its apparent speculativeness and specificity, and its rather 
troubling implication that there is a sense in which the Jews 
themselves, with their excessive confidence in their own 
superiority, are implicated in the production of anti-Semitism. 
First, Freud suggests that jealousy is a key element, arising from 
a fantasy that there really is something special about the Jew. 
This idea has entered into the common armoury of explanations of 
racism in general: the other group is seen as having some 
privilege, something special about them, and this envied thing 
fuels the hostility. Linked to this is the notion that the hated 
other is an object of fascination as well as hostility: the anti-
Semite cannot leave the Jew alone, is stirred and excited by the 
Jew, and is made real and alive only through this fascination. 
Likewise, explorations of anti-black racism have also noted that 
the racist needs the hated other, that the racialised opponent 
holds, in fantasy, repudiated but essential parts of the racist –
in the case of colour racism, this often being the white person’s 
repressed sensuality (Frosh, 2002; Kovel, 1995). Indeed, the white 
non-Jew may class the circumcised Jew and the black together as a 
sexual threat that is also a seduction and an excitement; Jung 
himself, as one of millions of examples, seems to have been 
sexually attracted to Jewish women (for instance Sabina Spielrein) 
as a product of, rather than in opposition to, his anti-Semitic 
tendencies. The ‘exoticism’ of the racialised other is thus both a 
source of attraction and of fear; the one emotion fuels the other 
in a powder keg of explosive ambivalence.  
 Freud did not lay out a systematic theory of racism, nor even 
of anti-Semitism. However, arising from his personal experience as 
much as, or perhaps more than, from his clinical judgement, he 
articulated the various sides of the Jewish experience that are 
related to anti-Semitic phenomena. The Jews are hated partly 
because they survive, they are forced into difference and this in 
turn provokes hatred, they are excluded and then seen as holding 
themselves separate. They are objects of fascination, seen as a 
kind of yeast for culture in general, but this creates envy; they 
are allowed only the currency of intellectuality and then their 
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fantasised ‘cleverness’ is feared. Above all, if psychoanalysis as 
well as popular culture is to be believed, they are sexualised, 
with their ‘castrated’ state provoking anxiety as well as desire.  
Jews like Freud, as well as psychoanalysts, might think that they 
are on the side of reason and hence of the advancement of human 
culture, but they very easily become the bearers of 
‘unreasonable’, irrational projections; that is, they become the 
carriers and recipients of culture’s repressed underside.  
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